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Batson v. Kentucky, 106 S. Ct. 1712 (1986).
I. INTRODUCTION
For over twenty years, since Swain v. Alabama,' the Supreme
Court has permitted prosecutors to use their peremptory challenges
in a particular case to exclude members of a racial minority from
petit jury service. The Court recently overturned this rule in Batson
v. Kentucky, 2 holding that whenever a criminal defendant makes a
prima facie case of purposeful discrimination, the burden shifts to
the prosecutor to explain his challenges on nonracial grounds.3
The Court's decision in Swain had been subjected to "two de-
cades [of] ... almost universal and scathing criticism ' 4 prior to Bat-
son. During that period, many state and federal courts used one of
two methods of circumventing Swain: several state courts relied on
state constitutional grounds to invalidate the discriminatory use of
peremptory challenges;5 panels of the Second and Sixth Circuits
reasoned that a number of sixth amendment cases decided subse-
quent to Swain (which addressed equal protection arguments) pro-
vide a separate federal constitutional basis for banning the practice. 6
1 380 U.S. 202 (1965).
2 106 S. Ct. 1712 (1986).
3 Id. at 1725. See infra, text accompanying notes 64-68.
4 McCray v. New York, 461 U.S. 961, 964 (1983)(Marshall,J., dissenting from denial
of certiorari).
5 People v Wheeler, 22 Cal. 3d 258, 583 P.2d 748, 148 Cal. Rptr. 890 (1978); State
v. Neil, 457 So. 2d 481 (Fla. 1984); Commonwealth v. Soares, 377 Mass. 461, 387
N.E.2d 499, cert. denied, 444 U.S. 881 (1979); State v. Crespin, 94 N.M. 486, 612 P.2d.
716 (Ct. App. 1980); but see People v. Payne, 99 Ill. 2d 135, 457 N.E.2d 1202 (1983).
6 Booker v. Jabe, 775 F.2d 762 (6th Cir. 1985); McCray v. Abrams, 750 F.2d 1113
(2d Cir. 1984); but see United States v. Leslie, 783 F.2d 541 (5th Cir. 1986)(en banc);
United States v. Brown, 770 F.2d 912 (10th Cir.) cert. granted, 106 S. Ct. 2275 (1986);
United States v. Childress, 715 F.2d 1313 (8th Cir. 1983)(en banc), cert. denied, 464 U.S.
1063 (1984); United States v. Whitfield, 715 F.2d 145 (4th Cir. 1983).
SUPREME COURT REVIEW
While the Court's decision in Batson resolves many of the equal
protection issues raised by the criticism of Swain,7 it poses a host of
new questions. Among the most important are: whether Batson
should be applied retroactively; whether challenges should be abol-
ished completely;8 whether the rule in Batson should apply to de-
fense counsel as well as prosecutors; and whether the discriminatory
use of peremptory challenges violates the sixth amendment as well
as the equal protection clause.
This Note reviews the decision in Swain and the subsequent ef-
forts of many state and federal courts to avoid the rule which it
promulgated. Next, it provides a discussion of the Court's decision
in Batson. The Note then examines the questions, outlined above,
which the Court's decision in Batson poses. Finally, the Note con-
cludes that the Court correctly decided Batson and recommends that
the Court extend its holding to defense counsel as well as
prosecutors.
II. THE ROAD TO BATSON
The Supreme Court first applied the fourteenth amendment to
discriminatory jury selection in Strauder v. West Virginia.9 In that
case, the Court invalidated a West Virginia statute which limited
both petit and grand jury service to white men.10 The Court rea-
soned that such discrimination on the face of a statute "is practically
a brand upon them [blacks], affixed by the law, an assertion of their
inferiority, and a stimulant to that race prejudice which is an impedi-
ment to securing to individuals of the race that equal justice which
the law aims to secure to all others."
1 1
While the question of statutory exclusion of blacks from jury
venires, and thus from petit juries, engenders a relatively simple
equal protection analysis, the exclusionary use of peremptory chal-
lenges is by no means as straightforward. "[B]oth prosecutors and
defense counsel have come to rely on the peremptory to remove
jurors they suspect of prejudice. By definition, the peremptory chal-
7 Perhaps the most telling of these criticisms challenged Swain on the ground that
the evidentiary standards of the decision precluded a remedy for the defendant when a
prosecutor systematically eliminated members of his race from the petit jury in that par-
ticular case. See McCray v. New York, 461 U.S. at 963 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
8 Batson, 106 S. Ct. at 1726 (Marshall, J., concurring).
9 I00 U.S. 303 (1880).
10 The statute provided that "[aIll white male persons who are twenty one years of
age and who are citizens of this state shall be liable to serve as jurors. Id. at 305
(quoting Acts of 1872-73, at 103).
11 100 U.S. at 308.
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lenge does not require an explanation." 12 The Court has long em-
phasized the importance of the peremptory challenge within the
criminal justice system. "Although the Court has held that the per-
emptory is not a constitutional requirement, it always has been con-
sidered one of the most effective means of securing an impartial jury
and of satisfying the defendant of that impartiality."'
3
Because the peremptory challenge allows attorneys on both
sides such untrammeled discretion, the potential for discriminatory
abuse has always existed. The race, religion, or gender of a pro-
spective juror has caused many attorneys to exercise a peremptory
challenge on the theory that the prospective juror's race, religion, or
gender will dispose him one way or the other toward the defendant.
This belief conflicts with the basic objectives underlying the equal
protection clause, in that the prosecutor, a representative of the
state, consciously discriminates on the basis of race, religion, or
gender. The Supreme Court finally resolved this conflict between
the fourteenth amendment and the traditions behind the peremp-
tory challenge when it decided Swain v. Alabama in 1965.
A. SWAIN V. ALABAMA
In Swain, an all-white jury convicted the petitioner, a black man,
of rape. 14 The jury was selected from a venire drawn from the gen-
eral population of Talladega County, Alabama. Black males consti-
tuted twenty-six percent of all males over twenty-one in the county.
Between ten and fifteen percent of the members of the jury panels
which produced grand and petit juries had been black during the
period between 1953 and 1965.15 In spite of these statistics, no
black had served on a petit jury since approximately 1950. Thejury
which convicted the petitioner in Swain was drawn from a venire
containing eight blacks. Two of these jurors were exempt, and the
prosecutor struck the other siX.
1 6
12 Saltzburg & Powers, Peremptory Challenges and the Clash Between Impartiality and Group
Representation, 41 MD. L. REV. 337, 340 (1982). The peremptory challenge serves as an
important component of the jury selection process. After the attorneys have conducted
the voir dire examination, they may exercise an unlimited number of challenges for cause.
In order to remove ajuror for cause, however, an attorney must prove actual or implied
bias, often an impossible task.
13 Id. at 341 (citing Stilson v. United States, 250 U.S. 583, 586 (1919)(footnote omit-
ted)). The Court in Stilson refused to interpret the sixth amendment to require that
several defendants be treated as a single party for the purpose of exercising their per-
emptory challenges, because nothing in the Constitution required Congress to grant
peremptory challenges in the first place. Id.
14 380 U.S. at 203.




In Part II of his majority opinion, Justice White provided a long
description of the history and value of the peremptory challenge.
He found that "[t]he function of the challenge is not only to elimi-
nate extremes of partiality on both sides, but to assure the parties
that the jurors before whom they try the case will decide on the basis
of the evidence placed before them, and not otherwise."' 17 Justice
White concluded:
With these considerations in mind, we cannot hold that the striking of
Negroes in a particular case is a denial of equal protection of the laws.
In the quest for an impartial and qualified jury, Negro and white, Prot-
estant and Catholic, are alike subject to being challenged without
cause.... In light of the purpose of the peremptory system and the
function it serves in a pluralistic society in connection with the institu-
tion ofjury trial, we cannot hold that the Constitution requires an ex-
amination of the prosecutor's reasons for the exercise of his
challenges in any given case. The presumption in any particular case
must be that the prosecutor is using the State's challenges to obtain a
fair and impartial jury to try the case before the court. The presump-
tion is not overcome and the prosecutor therefore subjected to exami-
nation by allegations that in the case at hand all Negroes were
removed from the jury or that they were removed because they were
Negroes.18
Justice White also addressed the petitioner's argument that the
prosecutor in Talladega County had systematically excluded blacks
from all petit juries, not just the one in petitioner's case. He
"agree[d] that this claim raises a different issue and it may well re-
quire a different answer."' 19 The Court, however, found the claim
invalid because the record did not establish a prima facie case of
systematic exclusion of blacks in the county. 20 The Court based its
finding on the fact that the record did not indicate when blacks had
been removed by the prosecution in Talladega County, when the
defense had agreed to exclude blacks from the jury, and when blacks
were removed for cause. The record thus
[did] not support an inference that the prosecutor was bent on striking
Negroes, regardless of trial related considerations. The fact remains,
of course, that there has not been a Negro on a jury in Talladega
County since about 1950. But the responsibility of the prosecutor is
17 Id. at 219.
18 Id. at 221-22.
19 Id. at 223.
20 Id. at 224. A prima facie case is established
when the prosecutor in a county, in case after case, whatever the circumstances,
whatever the crime and whoever the defendant or victim may be, is responsible for
the removal of Negroes who have been selected as qualified jurors by the jury com-
missioners and who have survived challenges for cause, with the result that no Ne-




not illuminated in this record.2 1
The three dissenting Justices disputed the Court's finding that
the record did not establish state involvement in the systematic ex-
clusion of blacks from juries in Talladega County. Moreover, they
contended that even if the record did not provide positive evidence
of state involvement, the very fact that no black had ever served on a
petit jury in the county established a prima facie case of unlawful
discrimination, shifting the burden to the state to prove a nonracial
reason for the exclusion.
22
More importantly, however, the dissent agreed with the Court's
conclusion that the systematic exclusion of blacks from the petit jury
in a particular case does not overcome the presumption that the
prosecutor did not base the exercise of his challenges on the race of
the veniremen. Thus, even if the dissent had prevailed in Swain,
[i]t would not mean .. . that Negroes are entitled to proportionate
representation on ajury .... Nor would it mean that where systematic
exclusion of Negroes from jury service has not been shown, a prosecu-
tor's motives are subject to question or judicial inquiry when he ex-
cludes Negroes or any other group from sitting on a jury in a
particular case.
2 3
Thus, eight of the nine Justices in Swain limited a defendant's right
to challenge discriminatory selection of a petit jury to cases where
he can show that such discrimination had occurred in a series of
cases over a period of years.
2 4
B. STATE APPROACHES
The Supreme Court of California, in People v. Wheeler,25 became
the first state supreme court to rely upon its own state constitution
to disallow a criminal conviction when the prosecutor removed all of
the blacks from the venire. The California court held that Article I,
Section 16 of the California Constitution 26 "includes the right to
have that verdict rendered by impartial and unprejudiced jurors."
2 7
In order to attain the benefits of this right, the court reasoned that
the jury must be drawn from a representative cross-section of the
21 Id. at 226.
22 Id. at 238 (Goldberg, J., dissenting) (citing Norris v. Alabama, 294 U.S. 587 (1935)
and Patton v. Mississippi, 332 U.S. 463 (1947)). ChiefJustice Warren andJustice Doug-
las joined Justice Goldberg's dissent.
23 Id. at 245 (Goldberg, J., dissenting) (citation omitted).
24 This view cannot be said to be unanimous becauseJustice Black concurred without
opinion in the result reached by the majority. Id. at 228 (Black, J., concurring).
25 22 Cal. 3d 258, 583 P.2d 748, 148 Cal. Rptr. 890.
26 "Trial by jury is an inviolate right and shall be secured to all .. " CAL. CONST. art.
I, § 16.
27 Wheeler, 22 Cal. 3d at 265, 583 P.2d at 754, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 895.
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community. 28 This right "is guaranteed equally and independently
by the Sixth Amendment to the federal Constitution and by article I,
section 16 of the California constitution.- 29 Finally, the court "con-
clude[d] that the use of peremptory challenges to remove prospec-
tive jurors on the sole ground of group bias violates the right to trial
by a jury drawn from a representative cross-section of the
community .... ,,30
The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, in Commonwealth
v. Soares,3 ' followed California's lead. The Soares court considered
an invitation by counsel for the Commonwealth to incorporate the
Swain standard into Article 12 of the Massachusetts constitution.
3 2
Like the California tribunal, the Soares court found that the jury must
be drawn from a cross-section of the community in order to satisfy
the constitutional mandate for an impartial jury.3 3 The Massachu-
setts court concluded "we view art. 12 of the Declaration of Rights
as proscribing.., the use of peremptory challenges to exclude pro-
spectivejurors solely by virtue of their membership in, or affiliation
with, particular, defined groupings in the community. ' 34
The Florida Supreme Court adopted the Wheeler-Soares ap-
proach to circumvent Swain.3 5 The Court of Appeals of New Mexico
wrote, in dicta, that "improper, systematic exclusion by use of per-
emptory challenges can be shown . . . under the Wheeler-Soares ra-
tionale and supported by Article II, Section 14 of the New Mexico
Constitution, where the absolute number of challenges in the one
case raises the inference of systematic acts by the prosecutor.
'3 6
Additionally, courts in Delaware and New Jersey also followed this
28 Id. at 265-72, 583 P.2d at 754-58, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 895-99.
29 Id. at 272, 583 P.2d at 758, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 899-900. The court relied heavily
upon the United States Supreme Court's similar conclusion concerning the sixth amend-
ment in Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522 (1975).
30 22 Cal. 3d at 276-77, 583 P.2d at 761-62, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 902.
31 377 Mass. 461, 387 N.E.2d 499, cert. denied, 444 U.S. 881 (1979).
32 Id. at 469, 387 N.E.2d at 508. Article 12 guarantees all defendants a fair trial by an
impartial jury. It provides that "no subject shall be arrested, imprisoned, despoiled, or
deprived of his property, immunities, or privileges, put out of the protection of the law,
or deprived of his life, liberty, or estate, but by the judgment of his peers, or the law of
the land." MASS. CONST. art. 12.
33 377 Mass. at 473, 387 N.E.2d at 511-12. This court also relied upon the Supreme
Court's decision in Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522 (1975).
34 377 Mass. at 477, 387 N.E.2d at 515.
35 The Supreme Court of Florida held that Article I, section 16 of the Florida Consti-
tution prohibits both the state and the defendant from employing peremptory chal-
lenges to exclude prospective jurors on account of race. State v. Neil, 457 So. 2d 481
(Fla. 1984).
36 State v. Crespin, 94 N.M. 486, 488, 612 P.2d 716, 718 (Ct. App. 1980). The
Supreme Court of New Mexico has not spoken on this issue.
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approach.37 Five state courts, however, refused to follow this line of
cases, preferring to apply analyses similar to that in Swain to the
state constitutional provisions at issue.38
C. THE SIXTH AMENDMENT APPROACH
As noted above, both the Wheeler and Soares courts observed
that the decision of the United States Supreme Court in Taylor v.
Louisiana39 may have precluded Swain under the sixth amendment.
At least two federal circuits have taken a further step. Both the Sec-
ond and Sixth Circuits held that while Swain precluded the invoca-
tion of the fourteenth amendment to overturn convictions in which
the prosecution has systematically employed its peremptory chal-
lenges against black veniremen in a particular case, the sixth amend-
ment, as interpreted in Taylor, mandates such a result.
40
The Second Circuit adopted the sixth amendment argument in
McCray v. Abrams.41 The McCray court refused to disregard the
37 Riley v. State, 496 A.2d 997 (Del. 1985), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 3339 (1986); State
v. Gilmore, 199 N.J. Super. 558, 489 A.2d 1175 (1985).
38 State v. Wiley, 144 Ariz. 525, 698 P.2d 1244 (1985) (en banc); People v. Fields, 697
P.2d 749 (Colo. App. 1984)(certiorari granted by Colorado Supreme Court, No. 84 S.C.
382, March 11, 1985); People v. Payne, 99 Ill. 2d 135, 457 N.E.2d 1202 (1983); Hobson
v. State, 471 N.E.2d 281 (Ind. 1984); Nevius v. State, 699 P.2d 1053 (Nev. 1985).
39 419 U.S. 522 (1975). See supra notes 29 & 33.
40 Booker v.Jabe, 775 F.2d 762 (6th Cir. 1985); McCray v. Abrams, 750 F.2d 1113
(2d Cir. 1984). The Supreme Court has never addressed the sixth amendment argu-
ment; the Batson majority specifically refused to consider it. 106 S. Ct. at 1716 n.4. This
Note will defer discussion of court of appeals cases opposed to this view uAtil Section
IV.D., which analyzes the sixth amendment considerations with regard to the discrimina-
tory use of peremptory challenges in light of Batson. See infra text accompanying notes
118-29.
41 750 F.2d 1113 (2d Cir. 1984). McCray had a long, checkered history in both the
New York courts and the federal courts. At trial, the defendant first moved for a mistrial
on the ground that the prosecution had excluded black jurors on account of their race.
The trial court denied this motion. People v. McCray, 104 Misc. 2d 782, 429 N.Y.S.2d
158 (Sup. Ct. Kings County 1980). The Appellate Division affirmed without opinion.
444 N.Y.S.2d 972 (1981). The New York Court of Appeals also affirmed, resting
squarely on the authority of Swain. 57 N.Y.2d 543, 549, 443 N.E.2d 915, 919, 457
N.Y.S.2d 441, 445 (1982). McCray then petitioned the United States Supreme Court for
a writ of certiorari. The Court's subsequent denial of certiorari was most unusual. Jus-
tice Marshall, joined by Justice Brennan, dissented from the denial and called for a re-
consideration of Swain. McCray v. New York, 461 U.S. 961, 966 (1983)(Marshall, J.,
dissenting). Even more interestingly, Justice Stevens, joined by Justices Blackmun and
Powell, agreed with Justice Marshall that the issue merited reconsideration but con-
curred in the denial of certiorari in order to allow the lower courts to provide further
assistance in its resolution. 461 U.S. at 961-63 (Stevens, J., concurring). McCray next
turned to the federal courts, seeking a writ of habeas corpus on the ground that the
prosecution's use of its peremptory challenges denied his sixth amendment rights. The
district court granted the petition as to the sixth amendment, and further concluded,
relying upon the opinions accompanying the denial of McCray's petition for certiorari
1986] 827
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Swain Court's reading of the equal protection clause.42 After re-
viewing the Supreme Court's analysis of the sixth amendment, the
court addressed the argument that the fair cross-section require-
ment, as delineated in Taylor, applied only to the selection of the
venire, not to the selection of the petit jury from the venire. The
court pointed out that the only reason for the venire's existence is to
produce petit juries; therefore, if the sixth amendment requires that
the venire be selected from a fair cross-section of the community,
"[t]he necessary implication is that the Sixth Amendment guaran-
tees the defendant.., the chance that the petit jury will be similarly
constituted.- 43 After observing that Swain did not immunize per-
emptory challenges from sixth amendment scrutiny,44 the court
concluded "that the Sixth Amendment's guarantee of trial by an im-
partial jury . . . forbids the exercise of such challenges to excuse
jurors solely on the basis of their racial affiliation" since such exclu-
sion necessarily precludes completely any possibility that the jury
will represent a fair cross-section of the community.
45
The Sixth Circuit adopted the sixth amendment argument in
Booker v. Jabe.4 6 Like the Second Circuit, the Booker court was clearly
dissatisfied with Swain, but refused to depart from its teaching with
regard to the equal protection clause. 47 The court, however, did
not end its analysis with the equal protection clause. The court in
Booker pointed out that the Supreme Court decided Swain three
years prior to Duncan v. Louisiana,48 which first applied the sixth
amendment to state criminal proceedings. 49 The court observed
that under current sixth amendment analysis, a jury must be "the
product of selection methods that provide a fair possibility for ob-
by the Supreme Court, that Swain was no longer good law with regard to the equal
protection clause. McCray v. Abrams, 576 F. Supp. 1244, 1249 (E.D.N.Y. 1983). The
state's appeal of this ruling finally brought the case before the Second Circuit. 750 F.2d
1113 (2d Cir. 1984).
42 McCray, 750 F.2d at 1123-24.
43 Id. at 1128-29.
44 Id. at 1130.
45 Id. at 1131.
46 775 F.2d 762 (6th Cir. 1985).
47 The court stated:
Were it within our power to right the manifest error that we believe Swain repre-
sents, we would hold that the prosecutor's conduct in the present case violated the
Equal Protection Clause .... [We ... accept that Swain is "clear, direct, and une-
quivocal" in prohibiting an "equal protection challenge to the prosecution's racially
discriminatory use of its permeptory challenges solely on the basis of the prosecu-
tion's acts in a single case."
Id. at 767 (quoting McCray, 750 F.2d at 1124).
48 391 U.S. 145 (1968).
49 Booker, 775 F.2d at 767.
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taining a representative cross-section of the community."'50 The
court concluded "that a prosecutor's systematic use of peremptory
challenges to exclude members of a cognizable group from a crimi-
nal petit jury offends the Sixth Amendment's protection of the de-
fendant's interest in a fair trial and the public's interest in the
integrity of the judicial process...."51
III. THE NEW STANDARD: BATSON V. KENTUCKY
In Batson, an all-white jury convicted the black petitioner of sec-
ond-degree burglary and the receipt of stolen goods. The racial
composition of the jury resulted from the prosecutor's use of his
peremptory challenges to exclude from the petit jury all four of the
black persons on the venire.52
The petitioner appealed his conviction to the Supreme Court of
Kentucky, urging the court to follow the decisions of other states,
notably California 53 and Massachusetts, 54 "and to hold that such
conduct violated his rights under the sixth amendment and Section
11 of the Kentucky Constitution 55 to a jury drawn from a cross-sec-
tion of the community."' 56 The Supreme Court of Kentucky refused
to follow Wheeler and Soares, noting that it had recently reaffirmed its
subscription to the Swain rule.57
A. THE MAJORITY OPINION
Writing for the majority, Justice Powell first reviewed the his-
tory of Supreme Court adjudication of the equal protection clause
as applied to the selection of juries. He observed that, under
Strauder v. West Virginia58 and its progeny, "[plurposeful racial dis-
50 Id. at 768 (citing Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522 (1975) and Williams v. Florida,
399 U.S. 78 (1970)).
51 Booker, 775 F.2d at 772. The court, in dicta, extended this holding to apply to
defense counsel on the ground that discriminatory use of the peremptory challenge by
defense counsel "could only impair the public's confidence in the integrity and imparti-
ality of the resulting jury." Id. See infra text accompanying notes 108-17.
52 Batson, 106 S. Ct. at 1715.
53 People v. Wheeler, 22 Cal. 3d 258, 583 P.2d 748, 148 Cal. Rptr. 890 (1978).
54 Commonwealth v. Soares, 377 Mass. 461, 387 N.E.2d 499, cert. denied, 444 U.S.
881 (1979).
55 Section 11 provides that "[i]n all criminal prosecutions the accused.., shall have a
speedy public trial by an impartial jury of the vicinage ...... Ky. CONST. § 11.
56 Batson, 106 S. Ct. at 1715. See supra text accompanying notes 25-38.
57 Id. at 1715-16. See Commonwealth v. McFerron, 680 S.W.2d 924, 927 (Ky. 1984).
There was "no suggestion that proof was offered or available to establish a prima fade
case of systematic exclusion of a distinctive group." Id. The court rested its holding
squarely on Swain. Id. at 926.
58 100 U.S. 303 (1880).
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crimination in selection of the venire violates a defendant's right to
equal protection because it denies him the protection that a trial by
jury is intended to secure." 59 He concluded that this basic principle
applies as well to the selection of the petit jury from the venire.
60
Justice Powell then analyzed Swain in terms of the evidentiary
burden it established for a defendant seeking to demonstrate the
state's discriminatory use of peremptory challenges. 61 He observed
that under Swain a defendant must prove that the prosecutor trying
his case had consistently excluded blacks from petit juries in a
number of cases. 62 Justice Powell noted that this standard "has
placed on defendants a crippling burden of proof... [rendering]
prosecutors' peremptory challenges . . largely immune from con-
stitutional scrutiny."
63
The Court next reviewed the development of the standards of
proof in making a prima facie case of discrimination in the selection
of jury venires and ascertained two distinct methods of doing so.
Under both methods, the defendant must first prove "that he is a
member of a racial group capable of being singled out for differen-
tial treatment." 64 Under the first method, the defendant must then
show that members of his race have not been included in jury
venires over an extended period.65 The second method requires
only that a defendant show "that members of the defendant's race
were substantially underrepresented on the venire from which his
jury was drawn, and that the venire was selected under a practice
providing 'the opportunity for discrimination.' "66 Thus, Justice
Powell recognized that "since the decision in Swain, this Court has
recognized that a defendant may make a prima facie showing of pur-
poseful discrimination in selection of the venire by relying solely on
the facts concerning its selection in his case." 67 He concluded that
these same standards for establishing a prima facie case should ap-
ply with regard to the use of peremptory challenges.
68
Paralleling the standards used with regard to discriminatory se-
59 Batson, 106 S. Ct. at 1717.
60 Id. at 1718-19.
61 Id. at 1719-22.
62 Id. at 1720.
63 Id. at 1720-21 (footnote omitted).
64 Id. at 1722 (citing Castenada v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482, 494 (1977)).
65 Id.
66 Id. (quoting Whitus v. Georgia, 385 U.S. 545, 552 (1967)). Justice Powell also
cited Castenada, 430 U.S. at 494; Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 241 (1976); Alexan-
der v. Louisiana, 405 U.S. 625, 629-31 (1972), for this proposition.
67 106 S. Ct. at 1722 (emphasis in original).
68 Id. at 1722-23.
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lection of the venire, the Court set out the evidentiary test for a
prima facie case of discriminatory use of peremptory challenges.
To establish such a case, the defendant first must show that he is a
member of a cognizable racial group, and that the prosecutor has ex-
ercised peremptory challenges to remove from the venire members of
defendant's race. Second, the defendant is entitled to rely on the fact,
as to which there can be no dispute, that peremptory challenges con-
stitute ajury selection practice that permits "those to discriminate who
are of a mind to discriminate." Finally, the defendant must show that
these facts and any other relevant circumstances raise an inference that
the prosecutor used that practice to exclude the veniremen from the
petit jury on account of their race.
69
The Court pointed out that the determination of whether a de-
fendant raises such an inference depends upon the circumstances
surrounding the use of the peremptory challenge and the conduct of
the voir dire examination. The Court acknowledged that it must rely
upon the experience and discretion of trial judges to make this de-
termination on a case-by-case basis.
70
Justice Powell emphasized, however, that the inquiry does not
end when the defendant establishes a prima facie case of discrimina-
tion. At that point, the burden shifts to the prosecutor to come for-
ward with a nonracial explanation for the use of his challenges. The
Court "emphasize[d] that the prosecutor's explanation need not
rise to the level justifying exercise of a challenge for cause." t71 A
prosecutor's explanation that he believed that a juror would favor
another member of his own race is insufficient.7 2 "Nor may the
prosecutor rebut the defendant's case merely by denying that he
had a discriminatory motive .... ,,73
Justice Powell concluded his opinion by dismissing the state's
arguments that judicial examination of prosecutorial motives during
jury selection "will eviscerate the fair trial values served by the per-
emptory challenge" and "create serious administrative difficul-
ties." 74 He pointed out that the jury system will be strengthened by
the elimination of racial discrimination. As for the administrative
burden, Justice Powell noted that no such problems had arisen in
those states which had already adopted the Court's holding on state
69 Id. at 1723 (quoting Avery v. Georgia, 345 U.S. 559, 562 (1953))(citations
omitted).




74 Id. at 1724. The administrative difficulties include the additional responsibility the




B. THE CONCURRING OPINIONS
Justices White and Marshall both filed concurring opinions in
Batson.76 Justice White, agreeing with the conclusions of the Court,
observed that the continued widespread practice of eliminating
blacks from petit juries forced the Court to allow inquiry into
prosecutorial motives. 77 He emphasized that the prosecutor must
be given the opportunity to provide trial-related reasons for his use
of his peremptories. 78 Finally, Justice White made clear that he
would not apply Batson retroactively.
79
Justice Marshall also agreed with the Court's conclusions but
argued that they should be extended further. He advocated the
complete elimination of the system of peremptory challenges as the
only way to end racial discrimination in the jury selection process.
80
He supported this suggestion by noting that the system adopted by
the Court, already practiced in several states as a matter of state law,
had two severe limitations. First, "defendants cannot attack the dis-
criminatory use of peremptory challenges at all unless the chal-
lenges are so flagrant as to establish a prima facie case."'
's
Moreover, even when a prima facie case is made, prosecutors, Jus-
tice Marshall wrote, have no difficulty fabricating a racially neutral
explanation.8 2 Justice Marshall concluded by stating that he does
not agree with suggestions that the challenge be preserved for de-
fendants while being removed from the prosecution on the ground
that "[o]ur criminal justice system 'requires not only freedom from
any bias against the accused, but also from any prejudice against his
75 Id.
76 Justices Stevens and O'Connor also filed concurring opinions. Justice Stevens ad-
dressed arguments in Chief Justice Burger's dissent that the petitioner had not
presented the equal protection question in his petition for certiorari and that the ques-
tion had not been properly briefed and argued. Id. at 1729-30 (Stevens,J., concurring).
Justice O'Connor's one sentence opinion indicated her acquiescence with the views of
both Justice White and Chief Justice Burger that the decision should not be applied
retroactively. Id. at 1731 (O'Connor, J., concurring). See infra text accompanying notes
93-99 for an analysis of the retroactivity issue.
77 Id. at 1725 (White, J., concurring). This continued practice apparently caused the
shift injustice White's views from the stance he took as author of the majority opinion in
Swain.
78 Id. (White, J., concurring).
79 Id. at 1726 (White, J., concurring)(citing DeStefano v. Woods, 392 U.S. 631
(1968)).
80 Id. (Marshall,J., concurring). See infra text accompanying notes 100-07 for an anal-
ysis of this argument.
81 Id. at 1727 (Marshall, J., concurring).




C. THE DISSENTING OPINIONS
ChiefJustice Burger dissented from the Court's holding on the
ground that "it is based on a constitutional argument [i.e., equal
protection] that the petitioner has expressly declined to raise, both in
this Court and in the Supreme Court of Kentucky."'8 4 The Chief
Justice also disagreed with the Court's resolution of the equal pro-
tection issues, arguing that the majority improperly insisted upon
addressing them. He contended that the Court's opinion lacked ap-
propriate deference to the history and tradition of the system of per-
emptory challenges. 85 He found that Strauder v. West Virginia
8 6
established a vast difference between exclusion from the venire and
exclusion from the petit jury itself; the former constitutes societal
stigmatization, while the latter merely " 'represents the discrete de-
cision, made by one of two or more opposed litigants.... that the
challenged venireperson will likely be more unfavorable to that liti-
gant in that particular case than others on the same venire.' "T87 The
Chief Justice also criticized the Court for not applying the conven-
tional equal protection analysis of comparing a classification to the
state interests furthered by it.88 Finally, he agreed with Justices
White and O'Connor in their concurring opinions that the Court's
decision in Batson should not be applied retroactively. 89
Justice Rehnquist's dissent first reviewed the Court's decision in
Swain, emphasizing that "[e]ven the.., dissenters did not take issue
with the majority's position that the Equal Protection Clause does
not prohibit the State from using its peremptory challenges to ex-
clude blacks based on the assumption or belief that they would be
partial to a black defendant." 90 He argued that use of peremptory
challenges to strike blacks from petit juries is not "unequal," be-
83 Id. at 1729 (Marshall, J., concurring) (quoting Hayes v. Missouri, 120 U.S. 68, 70
(1887)).
84 Id. at 1731 (Burger, CJ., dissenting)(emphasis in original).
85 Id. at 1734-36 (Burger, CJ., dissenting).
86 100 U.S. 303 (1880).
87 Batson, 106 S. Ct. at 1736 (Burger, CJ., dissenting)(quoting United States v. Les-
lie, 783 F.2d 541, 554 (5th Cir. 1986))(emphasis in original).
88 Batson, 106 S. Ct. at 1737-38 (Burger, CJ., dissenting). ChiefJustice Burger ar-
gued that the state interest in the system of peremptory challenges is "substantial, if not
compelling." Id. at 1738 (Burger, CJ., dissenting). Under standard equal protection
analysis, the Court applies "most rigid scrutiny" to facially discriminatory state actions,
but such actions will nevertheless be upheld if they are deemed necessary to achieve a
compelling state objective. See Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944).
89 Batson, 106 S. Ct. at 1741 (Burger, CJ., dissenting).
90 Id. at 1744 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
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cause they may also be used to strike whites, Hispanics, and Asians
in cases involving defendants of those races. 9 1 Justice Rehnquist
concluded that the Court's departure from the Swain standard is not
justified by "anything in the Equal Protection Clause, or any other
constitutional provision .. "92
IV. ISSUES RAISED BY THE DECISION IN BATSON
The Court's withdrawal from the permissive standards of Swain
raises several new issues with regard to the discriminatory use of
peremptory challenges. Foremost among these are: (1) Does the
Court's decision in Batson apply retroactively to criminal convictions
which became final before it was announced?; (2) should the Court
go beyond Batson and abolish peremptory challenges completely?;
(3) should Batson apply to defense counsel as well as prosecutors?;
and (4) does the discriminatory use of peremptory challenges vio-
late the sixth amendment? This section will examine each of these
questions in turn.
A. DOES BATSON APPLY RETROACTIVELY?
Four of the nine Justices stated that the Batson decision should
not be applied retroactively.9 3 The Court specifically reached this
conclusion, at least with regard to convictions made final prior to
the decision in Batson, in Allen v. Hardy.94 The Court in Allen listed
three factors traditionally considered in deciding whether a new
constitutional rule of criminal procedure should apply retroactively:
" '(a) the purpose to be served by the new standards, (b) the extent of
the reliance by law enforcement authorities on the old standards, and
(c) the effect on the administration of justice of a retroactive applica-
tion of the new standards.' "5
Applying these factors to the rule in Batson, the Allen Court
found that the new standards did not exclusively bear upon the
jury's truthfinding function but served multiple objectives. Because
91 Id. (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
92 Id. at 1745 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
93 Id. at 1726 (White, J., concurring); id. at 1731 (O'Connor, J., concurring); and id.
at 1741 (Burger, C.J., dissenting, joined by Rehnquist, J.).
94 106 S. Ct. 2878 (1986). The Allen Court, speaking in a per curiam opinion, "ex-
press[ed] no view on the question whether our decision in Batson should be applied to
cases that were pending on direct appeal at the time our decision was announced." Id.
at 2880 n.1. The Court has since granted certiorari and heard oral argument on two
cases presenting this question. Griffith v. Kentucky, 85-5521 and Brown v. United
States, 85-5731, both argued October 14, 1986.
95 Allen, 106 S. Ct. at 2880 (quoting Solem v. Stumes, 465 U.S. 638, 643 (1984)(quot-
ing Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293, 297 (1967))).
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it joins other mechanisms designed to ensure neutral factfinding,
the Court noted that it could not "say that the new rule has such a
fundamental impact on the integrity of factfinding as to compel ret-
roactive application." 96 Moreover, the Court found that Batson di-
rectly overruled Swain and "that prosecutors, trial judges, and
appellate courts throughout our state and federal systems justifiably
have relied on the standard of Swain."' 97 This fact also mitigated
against retroactive application. Finally, the Court found that retro-
active application could create a potentially enormous burden on
the administration of justice. Under Swain, prosecutors had no
cause to develop an explanation for the use of their peremptory
challenges. As a result, the evidentiary difficulties on retrial, years
after the original conviction, would be mind-boggling.98 For these
reasons, the Court concluded that Batson should not apply
retroactively. 99
B. SHOULD PEREMPTORY CHALLENGES BE ABOLISHED COMPLETELY?
Justice Marshall argued in Batson that the equal protection
clause requires that the system of peremptory challenges be abol-
ished, given the potential for discriminatory abuse which even the
new standards of Batson cannot completely eradicate.' 00 The Batson
majority specifically rejected this view. The Court did not "think
that this historic trial practice, which long has served the selection of
an impartial jury, should be abolished because of an apprehension
that prosecutors and trial judges will not perform conscientiously
their respective duties under the Constitution."' 0'1 Justice Marshall
therefore stands alone in his total opposition to the system of per-
emptory challenges.' 0 2
Support for the abolition of peremptory challenges appears to
be equally sparse among commentators. Even those commentators
who have called for total abolition to remedy the problems of abuse
have done so with some reservation. One of the most frequently
cited articles favoring abolition offered a caveat to its argument,
stating that peremptory challenges should be abolished "[u]nless




100 Batson, 106 S. Ct. at 1726 (Marshall, J., concurring).
101 Id. at 1724 n.22.
102 This conclusion is drawn from the remarks of the majority, noted above, and from
the fact that both Chief Justice Burger and Justice Rehnquist criticized Batson itself as
impinging too greatly on the traditional systemn of peremptory challenges. Clearly,
neither would favor its dismantling.
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and until courts are equipped with effective means for intervening
against discriminatory uses of peremptory challenges. .. .
Moreover, some commentators who have advocated abolition of
peremptory challenges have admitted that many good reasons exist
for retaining them.'0 4 Finally, even commentators who have sug-
gested abolition have not offered detailed analyses supporting this
suggestion, since its adoption is such "an unlikely event in the real
world." 0
5
Defenders of the peremptory challenge have forcefully
presented cogent reasons for maintaining the practice:
Peremptory challenges serve to remove those jurors whose neutrality
parties suspect, when the parties cannot prove partiality with enough
certainty to justify a challenge for cause. In addition, they protect the
exercise of the challenge for cause by allowing a party to remove a
juror whom he has alienated through extensive voir dire aimed at
identifying possible biases. The peremptory also seeks to insure that a
party has a good opinion of the jury by allowing him to remove anyone
he intuitively dislikes. 10 6
For these reasons, the Supreme Court should not abandon the
peremptory challenge. The new standards adopted in Batson should
greatly reduce the potential for discriminatory abuse by requiring
prosecutors to justify the use of their peremptory challenges to
eliminate all members of a discrete and insular minority from the
venire in a particular case. The value of the peremptory challenge
as a means of ensuring the selection of ajury satisfactory to both the
defendant and the state should preclude its elimination. Even if one
accepts Justice Marshall's premise that peremptory challenges are
inherently prone to abuse whatever the safeguards, the cost of aboli-
tion to both the defendant and the state 0 7 is too high to justify the
103 Brown, McGuire, & Winters, The Peremptory Challenge as a Manipulative Device in
Criminal Trials: Traditional Use or Abuse, 14 NEw ENG. L. REV. 192, 234 (1978).
104 J. VAN DYKE, JURY SELECTION PROCEDURES 167-68 (1977). These reasons include
the importance of attaining an impartial jury (especially after ajuror has been potentially
alienated by an unsuccessful challenge for cause), of both the prosecutor and the de-
fense believing in the impartiality of the jury, and of public perception of jury
impartiality.
105 Singer, Peremptory Holds: A Suggestion (Only Half Specious) of a Solution to the Discrimi-
natory Use of Peremptory Challenges, 62 U. DET. L. REV. 275, 287 (1978); see also Comment,
Curbing Prosecutorial Abuse of Peremptory Challenges-The Available Alternatives, 3 W. NEW
ENG. L. REV. 223, 234-35 (1980).
106 Saltzburg & Powers, Peremptory Challenges and the Clash Between Impartiality and Group
Representation, 41 MD. L. REV. 337, 356; see also Note, McCray v. Abrams: An End to Abuse of
the Peremptory Challenge? 59 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 603, 614-15 (1985).
107 These costs include the inability to removejurors whose partiality a party suspects,
but cannot prove; the risk of alienating jurors during the voir dire examination; and the
general discomfort of arguing before jurors whom the party instinctively dislikes.
Saltzburg & Powers, supra note 106, at 356.
[Vol. 77836
PEREMPTORY CHALLENGES
benefit of eliminating the last vestige of discrimination from jury
selection.
C. DOES BATSON APPLY TO DEFENSE COUNSEL AS WELL AS
PROSECUTORS?
The Batson Court "express[ed] no views on whether the Consti-
tution imposes any limit on the exercise of peremptory challenges
by defense counsel."108 However, many of the lower courts, both
federal and state, addressed the issue in their use of the cross-sec-
tion requirement of the sixth amendment to circumvent Swain.
In its analysis, the Sixth Circuit found that defense counsel, like
prosecutors, may not use peremptory challenges to eliminate mem-
bers of a petit jury in a given case. 10 9 The court pointed out that the
sixth amendment guarantees only an impartial jury, not a jury
favorable to the defendant's cause. "The spectacle of a defense
counsel systematically excusing potential jurors because of their
race or other shared group identity while the prosecutor and trial
judge were constrained merely to observe, could only impair the
public's confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the resulting
jury." 110 The court therefore refused to excuse defense counsel
from the standards applied to prosecutors.
Both California and Massachusetts extended, in dicta, the pro-
hibition to defense counsel.11' In People v. Wheeler, the California
Supreme Court held that "the People no less than individual de-
fendants are entitled to a trial by an impartial jury drawn from a
representative cross-section of the community. Furthermore, to
hold to the contrary would frustrate other essential functions served
by the requirement of cross-sectionalism." 112  Similarly, the
Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts in Commonwealth v. Soares
"deem[ed] the Commonwealth equally to be entitled to a represen-
tative jury, unimpaired by improper exercise of peremptory chal-
lenges by the defense."" 3 These holdings add weight to the federal
108 Batson, 106 S. Ct. at 1718 n.12
109 Booker, 775 F.2d at 772.
110 Id.
111 See supra text accompanying notes 25-38.
112 Wheeler, 22 Cal. 3d at 382 n.29, 583 P.2d at 765 n.29, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 907 n.29.
These "other essential functions" referred to by the court include "legitimating the
judgments of the courts, promoting citizen participation in government, and preventing
further stigmatizing of minority groups." Id. at 267 n.6, 583 P.2d at 755 n.6, 148 Cal.
Rptr. at 896 n.6.
113 Soares, 377 Mass. at 479 n.35, 387 N.E.2d at 517 n.35. The Florida Supreme Court
also "agree[d] with Wheeler and Soares on this point and [held] that both the state and the
defense may challenge the allegedly improper use of peremptories." State v. Neil, 457
So. 2d 481, 487 (Fla. 1984).
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rulings on the question, because the state constitutional grounds
which formed their basis are similar to the sixth amendment.
The foregoing authorities establish a reciprocal right of prose-
cutors to challenge the improper use of peremptory challenges by
defense counsel under the sixth amendment. It is, however, by no
means a foregone conclusion that the Supreme Court will reach
such a result in the wake of Batson, given that the Court grounded its
decision there in the equal protection clause of the fourteenth
amendment, not the sixth amendment.
In order to establish a violation of the equal protection clause,
one must show that the challenged action is a "state action."' 1 4 The
improper use of peremptory challenges by the prosecutor is a state
action because the prosecutor embodies and represents the state in
a criminal proceeding. The same may not be said, however, with
regard to defense counsel. Even when defense counsel is a public
defender employed by the state, he "does not act under color of
state law when performing a lawyer's traditional functions as coun-
sel to a defendant in a criminal proceeding."'1 15
The equal protection clause does not prohibit defense counsel
from using their peremptory challenges in a discriminatory fashion.
Nevertheless, it does not seem possible, "[o]nce the Court has held
that prosecutors are limited in their use of peremptory challenges, [to]
... rationally hold that defendants are not. '"116 General notions of
fairness dictate that defense counsel not be allowed to use discrimi-
natory practices forbidden to prosecutors. Because the equal pro-
tection clause does not prevent such a result, in order to prevent it
the Court must turn to the sixth amendment. The Court has histori-
cally viewed the impartiality of the jury to require that "[b]etween
[the defendant] and the state the scales are to be evenly held."
117
114 The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 6 (1883).
115 Polk County v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 325 (1981). The issue in Dodson was raised
when a defendant convicted of robbery brought an action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983
to overturn his conviction on the ground that the public defender assigned to his case
had not adequately represented him. Thus, the question was whether the public de-
fender had acted "under color of state law" for the purposes of a § 1983 suit. The
Supreme Court has held that "[i]n cases under § 1983, 'under color' of law has consist-
ently been treated as the same thing as the 'state action' required under the Fourteenth
Amendment." United States v. Price, 383 U.S. 787, 794 n.7 (1966). See also Briscoe v.
Lahue, 460 U.S. 325, 328 n.6 (1983).
116 Batson, 106 S. Ct. at 1738 (Burger, CJ., dissenting) (emphasis in original). In fact,
"every jurisdiction which has spoken to the matter, and prohibited prosecution case-
specific peremptory challenges on the basis of cognizable group affiliation, has held that
the defendant must likewise be so prohibited." United States v. Leslie, 783 F.2d 541,
565 (5th Cir. 1986)(en banc).
117 Hayes v. Missouri, 120 U.S. 68, 70 (1887).
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Surely, nothing could be so uneven as binding the prosecution to
the Batson standards while allowing the defense to use his peremp-
tory challenges in a discriminatory manner. In order to extend to
defense counsel the requirements set down in Batson, the Court
must first decide whether the systematic exclusion of minorities
from petit juries in particular cases violates the fair cross-section
component of the sixth amendment.
D. DOES THE DISCRIMINATORY EXERCISE OF PEREMPTORY
CHALLENGES IN A PARTICULAR CASE VIOLATE THE SIXTH
AMENDMENT?
As with the question of the applicability of their decision to de-
fense counsel, the Batson Court "express[ed] no view on the merits
of any of petitioner's Sixth Amendment arguments." 118 Both the
state" 9 and the federal 120 arguments in favor of applying the fair
cross-section requirement of the sixth amendment to the discrimi-
natory use of peremptory challenges were outlined above. The ar-
guments against a sixth amendment rationale supporting the result
in Batson should ultimately be rejected. The cross-section require-
ment of the sixth amendment should preclude both prosecutors and
defense counsel from exercising their peremptory challenges in a
discriminatory manner. The discriminatory use of peremptory chal-
lenges precludes the possibility that the jury will represent a fair
cross-section of the community, because such use, by design, elimi-
nates a significant segment of the community. 121 The Court's deci-
sion in Batson under the equal protection clause renders the point
moot with regard to prosecutors, but sixth amendment analysis is
essential with regard to defense counsel.
Three basic rationales have been offered to support the conten-
tion that the fair cross-section requirement does not forbid the ex-
clusionary exercise of peremptory challenges in a particular case:
118 Batson, 106 S. Ct. at 1716 n.4. Justice Marshall, joined by Justice Brennan, earlier
spoke favorably of the sixth amendment argument in his dissent to the denial of certio-
rari in McCray v. New York, 461 U.S. 961 (1983).
119 See supra text accompanying notes 25-38 for an examination of state supreme
court cases which relied on both state constitutional requirements and the sixth amend-
ment (as interpreted in Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522) to avoid the rule in Swain. See
also People v. Wheeler, 22 Cal. 3d 258, 583 P.2d 748, 148 Cal. Rptr. 890 (1978); Com-
monwealth v. Soares, 377 Mass. 461, 387 N.E.2d 499, cert. denied, 444 U.S. 881 (1979).
120 See supra text accompanying notes 39-51 for a review of the decisions of the Sec-
ond and Sixth Circuits holding that the fair cross-section requirement of the sixth
amendment forbids the use of peremptory challenges in order to exclude minorities
from criminal petit juries in particular cases. See also Booker v. Jabe, 775 F.2d 762; Mc-
Cray v. Abrams, 750 F.2d 1113.
121 See Booker, 775 F.2d at 770-73; McCray, 750 F.2d at 1128.
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the "apparent use of fair-cross-section language to mask an equal
protection solution; the difficulty in identifying protected groups;
and the ramifications to the whole process of subjecting peremptory
challenges to judicial scrutiny."' 1 22 The first rationale is valid with
regard to cases such as Wheeler, Soares, McCray, and Booker.' 23 This
criticism, however, would not apply to a sixth amendment holding
in the wake of Batson, because the Court decided Batson itself on
equal protection grounds. The Court designed the procedures in
Batson to remedy a violation of the equal protection clause. It is not
incompatible for the same action giving rise to equal protection
remedies to have also violated the sixth amendment. In such a case,
the equal protection violation justifies the equal protection reme-
dies. The same action, as a sixth amendment violation, justifies the
application of those remedies to defense counsel under the sixth
amendment.1
24
The second criticism focuses on the idea that all peremptory
challenges are ultimately based on some group affiliation. For ex-
ample, "who would deny the right of a defendant accused of embez-
zlement to . . .challenge a banker, the propriety in a complex
antitrust criminal case of a prosecutor's exclusion of a high school
dropout, or the right of a plaintiff in an automobile accident case to
remove the insurance company employee?"' 25 This argument,
however, does not recognize that the Court has historically re-
frained from sliding down slippery slopes of this sort, limiting this
rule to groups which are "sufficiently numerous and distinct ... that
if they are systematically eliminated from jury panels, the Sixth
Amendment's fair-cross-section requirement cannot be satis-
fied."' 126 Moreover, whatever the validity of this criticism, it applies
as much to the rule announced in Batson under the equal protection
clause as to an extension of the rationale to include the sixth amend-
122 Doyel, In Search of a Remedy for the Racially Discriminatory Use of Peremptory Challenges,
38 OKLA. L. REV. 385, 432 (1985). See also Comment, Rethinking Limitations on the Peremp-
tory Challenge, 85 CoLuM. L. REV. 1357, 1368-69 (1985).
123 The remedies in those cases, as in Batson, all involved a procedure whereby the
defendant could make a prima facie case by showing that members of a definable group
had been systematically excluded by the prosecutor. The prosecutor could rebut the
presumption created by this prima facie case by showing that racially neutral selection
criteria were used. Under traditional sixth amendment analysis, prosecutorial intent is
not relevant, so this test clearly sets out an equal protection standard. Doyel, supra note
122 at 433-34. See also Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 241 (1976).
124 It would be inefficient and inequitable to fashion sixth amendment remedies in
cases involving defense counsel (because defense counsel is not a state actor and thus
can only violate the sixth amendment, not the equal protection clause) while fashioning
different, equal protection remedies under Batson in cases involving prosecutors.
125 Doyel, supra note 122, at 436.
126 Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 531 (1975).
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ment. Thus, the Court in Batson presumably already considered and
rejected this criticism.
Finally, the third criticism reflects a concern for the administra-
tive difficulty within the criminal justice system of applying the fair
cross-section requirement to the use of peremptory challenges.
Again, this criticism applies equally to the rule announced in Batson,
where the majority explicitly rejected the argument, observing that
"[i]n those states applying a version' of the evidentiary standard we
recognize today, courts have not experienced serious administrative
burdens, and the peremptory challenge system has survived."'
127
Thus, the Court's decision in Batson apparently precludes the
bulk of the criticism directed against application of the fair cross-
section requirement of the sixth amendment to the discriminatory
exercise of peremptory challenges. This criticism goes more to the
practical problems raised by the evidentiary standards announced
by the Court than to the constitutional rationale for requiring those
standards. Problems, such as the identity of protected groups and
the administrative burden on the judicial system, arise whether the
new standard is grounded in the fourteenth or sixth amendment.
The court of appeals cases attacking the sixth amendment approach
confirmed this conclusion by relying almost exclusively upon Swain,
an equal protection case, in rejecting the sixth amendment argu-
ment. They refused to consider the sixth amendment rationale on
its own merits, holding that Swain precluded its application. As one
court concluded:
[W]e are not convinced that Taylor and its sixth amendment analysis
have in effect overruled Swain and now restrict the government's use
of the peremptory challenge to remove black prospective jurors. This
does not mean that we entirely disapprove of the ... analysis, rather
we believe that any attack upon the government's use of the peremp-
tory challenge must squarely confront Swain.... The Supreme Court
has not reconsidered Swain and until that time, of course, we must
follow Swain.1
28
With the removal of the roadblock of Swain, the argument against a
sixth amendment approach to the discriminatory exercise of per-
emptory challenges in a particular case loses much of its force. The
requirement that both the state and the defendant have an opportu-
nity for a trial before a petit jury composed of a fair cross-section of
the community is not satisfied if either side may exercise its peremp-
127 Batson, 106 S. Ct. at 1724 (footnote omitted).
128 United States v. Childress, 715 F.2d 1313, 1320 (8th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 464
U.S. 1063 (1984). See also United States v. Leslie, 783 F.2d 541 (5th Cir. 1986); United
States v. Whitfield, 715 F.2d 145 (4th Cir. (1983) (specifically rejecting sixth amendment
analysis on the ground that Swain precludes it.)
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tory challenges to exclude members of a cognizable group from the
jury. 129
V. CONCLUSION
The Court's decision in Batson v. Kentucky fundamentally
changed the procedures under which courts address allegations of
discriminatory exercise of peremptory challenges. Under the old
system, set out in Swain v. Alabama, a defendant had to show that the
prosecutor used his peremptory challenges to systematically exclude
blacks from petit juries in case after case over the course of many
years.1 30 While the rule in Swain theoretically prohibited the use of
peremptory challenges against blacks solely on account of their
race, the practical effect of the Court's refusal to examine
prosecutorial motives in a particular case made the burden of sus-
taining an allegation of such conduct so heavy that "almost no other
defendants in the nearly two decades since the Swain decision have
met this standard .. ."31 The Batson decision considerably light-
ened this burden. Under the new rule, a defendant need only show
"that he is the member of a cognizable racial group, and that the
prosecutor has exercised peremptory challenges to remove from the
venire members of the defendant's race."' 32 The defendant may
then show that these two facts, in addition to any other relevant cir-
cumstances, raise an inference that the prosecutor based the exer-
cise of his peremptory challenges on the race of the veniremen. The
prosecutor then has the opportunity to rebut this inference by com-
ing forward with race-neutral reasons for his challenges. 33
The new evidentiary standards set forth in Batson raise several
questions. The Court has already answered in the negative the first
of those considered in this Note, whether the decision in Batson ap-
plies retroactively. 34 The Court has also refused, albeit in a foot-
note, to abolish peremptory challenges altogether. 3 5  The
resolution of the third and fourth issues raised by Batson is much less
129 McCray, 750 F.2d at 1128.
130 Swain, 380 U.S. at 222. The Court specifically refused to "hold that the Constitu-
tion requires an examination of the prosecutor's reasons for the exercise of his chal-
lenges in any given case." Id.
131 McCray, 750 F.2d at 1120. A search of the cases in which defendants have alleged
discriminatory use of peremptory challenges by prosecutors revealed no cases where the
defendant met the Swain burden.
132 Batson, 106 S. Ct. at 1723.
133 Id.
134 Allen v. Hardy, 106 S. Ct. 2878. See supra text accompanying notes 93-99.
135 Batson, 106 S. Ct. at 1724 n.22. A solid majority of commentators support the
Court's rejection of an abandonment of the system of peremptory challenges, as advo-
cated by Justice Marshall. See supra text accompanying notes 103-06.
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certain. The Court has not yet addressed the question of whether
the standards set forth in Batson should apply to defense counsel as
well as prosecutors. While virtually all of the lower courts promul-
gating standards similar to those adopted in Batson have applied
them to defense counsel, the Supreme Court cannot so easily reach
the same result. These lower courts grounded their decisions in the
sixth amendment or in state constitutional provisions similar to it;
the Batson Court based its holding on the equal protection clause.
Any attempt to apply Batson to defense counsel faces grave state ac-
tion problems.1
3 6
For this reason, the question of whether the sixth amendment
also requires the evidentiary standards found by the Batson Court
under the equal protection clause takes on some importance, de-
spite the fact that the decision in Batson seemingly rendered it moot.
The basic argument in favor of the application of the sixth amend-
ment emerges from the requirement that juries be drawn from a fair
cross-section of the community.' 3 7 Although a "defendant has no
right to a petit jury of any particular composition . . ., [the] Sixth
Amendment requirement that the venire represent a fair cross sec-
tion of the community . . .must logically [exist] .. .because it is
important that the defendant have the chance that the petit jury will
be similarly constituted."'
' 38
All three of the major arguments against this proposition ulti-
mately rest on the authority of Swain; Batson renders them irrele-
vant. 13 9 Thus, the Supreme C6urt should find a sixth amendment
basis for the standards announced in Batson under the equal protec-
tion clause. Once the Court establishes that basis in the sixth
amendment, there can be little doubt that it will apply the proce-
dures of Batson to defense counsel in order to protect "the public's
confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the ... jury," clearly
an integral element of the sixth amendment. 140 Only at that point
will the Court rid the jury selection system of unconstitutional dis-
crimination to the greatest extent possible, while remaining within
the confines of the system of peremptory challenges.
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136 See supra text accompanying notes 108-17.
137 Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522. (1975).
138 McCray, 750 F.2d at 1128 (emphasis added). See also Booker, 775 F.2d at 770-71;
supra text accompanying notes 118-24.
139 See supra text accompanying notes 119-25.
140 Booker, 775 F.2d at 772.
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